270 lines
11 KiB
Python
270 lines
11 KiB
Python
"""
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Service health failure-only notification policy snapshot.
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Loads the latest committed, read-only service health notification policy. The
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policy defines success-noise suppression, failure/action-required escalation,
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message redaction, and frontend display limits. It never sends Telegram or
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AwoooP notifications, writes operator events, probes live systems, restarts
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services, changes endpoints, triggers workflows, reads secrets, or displays
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internal conversation transcripts.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import json
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from pathlib import Path
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from typing import Any
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from src.services.snapshot_paths import default_evaluations_dir
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_DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR = default_evaluations_dir(Path(__file__))
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_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN = "service_health_failure_notification_policy_*.json"
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_SCHEMA_VERSION = "service_health_failure_notification_policy_v1"
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_CONVERSATION_TRANSCRIPT_MARKERS = {
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"# In app browser",
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"My request for Codex",
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"Current URL:",
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"AGENTS.md instructions",
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"<environment_context>",
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"批准！繼續",
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}
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def load_latest_service_health_failure_notification_policy(
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evaluations_dir: Path | None = None,
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) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"""Load the newest committed service health failure notification policy."""
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directory = evaluations_dir or _DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR
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candidates = sorted(directory.glob(_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN))
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if not candidates:
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raise FileNotFoundError(
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f"no service health failure notification policy snapshots found in {directory}"
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)
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latest = candidates[-1]
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with latest.open(encoding="utf-8") as handle:
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payload = json.load(handle)
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if not isinstance(payload, dict):
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raise ValueError(f"{latest}: expected JSON object")
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_require_schema(payload, _SCHEMA_VERSION, str(latest))
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_require_read_only_boundaries(payload, str(latest))
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_require_operation_boundaries(payload, str(latest))
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_require_rollup_consistency(payload, str(latest))
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_require_success_noise_suppression(payload, str(latest))
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_require_failure_only_escalation(payload, str(latest))
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_require_frontend_redaction_contract(payload, str(latest))
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_require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(payload, str(latest))
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_require_no_conversation_transcript_content(payload, str(latest))
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return payload
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def _require_schema(payload: dict[str, Any], expected: str, label: str) -> None:
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actual = payload.get("schema_version")
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if actual != expected:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: expected schema_version={expected}, got {actual!r}")
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def _require_read_only_boundaries(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
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program_status = payload.get("program_status") or {}
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if program_status.get("read_only_mode") is not True:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: program_status.read_only_mode must be true")
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approval_boundaries = payload.get("approval_boundaries") or {}
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allowed = sorted(key for key, value in approval_boundaries.items() if value is not False)
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if allowed:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: approval boundaries must remain false: {allowed}")
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def _require_operation_boundaries(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
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boundaries = payload.get("operation_boundaries") or {}
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if boundaries.get("read_only_policy_allowed") is not True:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: read_only_policy_allowed must be true")
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blocked_flags = {
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"notification_send_allowed",
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"telegram_test_message_allowed",
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"awooop_event_write_allowed",
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"live_probe_allowed",
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"external_health_probe_allowed",
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"service_restart_allowed",
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"endpoint_change_allowed",
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"workflow_trigger_allowed",
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"runtime_execution_allowed",
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"secret_plaintext_allowed",
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}
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allowed = sorted(flag for flag in blocked_flags if boundaries.get(flag) is not False)
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if allowed:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: operation boundaries must remain false: {allowed}")
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def _require_rollup_consistency(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
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rules = payload.get("policy_rules") or []
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rollups = payload.get("rollups") or {}
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if rollups.get("total_rules") != len(rules):
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.total_rules must match policy_rules")
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by_decision: dict[str, int] = {}
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for rule in rules:
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decision = str(rule.get("decision"))
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by_decision[decision] = by_decision.get(decision, 0) + 1
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if rollups.get("by_decision") != by_decision:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.by_decision must match policy rule decisions")
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immediate_ids = {
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rule.get("rule_id")
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for rule in rules
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if rule.get("decision") == "escalate_immediate"
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}
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if set(rollups.get("immediate_escalation_rule_ids") or []) != immediate_ids:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.immediate_escalation_rule_ids must match immediate rules")
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suppressed_success_ids = {
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rule.get("rule_id")
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for rule in rules
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if rule.get("service_state") == "verified"
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and rule.get("decision") == "suppress_immediate_success"
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}
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if set(rollups.get("suppressed_success_rule_ids") or []) != suppressed_success_ids:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.suppressed_success_rule_ids must match suppressed success rules")
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action_required_ids = {
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rule.get("rule_id")
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for rule in rules
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if rule.get("decision") == "create_action_required"
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}
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if set(rollups.get("action_required_rule_ids") or []) != action_required_ids:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.action_required_rule_ids must match action-required rules")
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if rollups.get("notification_send_allowed_count") != 0:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.notification_send_allowed_count must remain 0")
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def _require_success_noise_suppression(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
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channels = payload.get("notification_channels") or []
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noisy_channels = [
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channel.get("channel_id")
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for channel in channels
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if channel.get("success_immediate_allowed") is not False
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]
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if noisy_channels:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: channels must not allow success immediate notifications: {noisy_channels}")
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success_escalations = [
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rule.get("rule_id")
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for rule in payload.get("policy_rules") or []
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if rule.get("service_state") == "verified"
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and rule.get("decision") != "suppress_immediate_success"
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]
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if success_escalations:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: verified service health rules must suppress immediate notifications")
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template_contract = payload.get("message_template_contract") or {}
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success_policy = str(template_contract.get("success_message_policy") or "")
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if "不得即時" not in success_policy or "Telegram / AwoooP" not in success_policy:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: success_message_policy must suppress Telegram / AwoooP success noise")
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def _require_failure_only_escalation(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
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escalation_rules = [
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rule
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for rule in payload.get("policy_rules") or []
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if rule.get("decision") == "escalate_immediate"
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]
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invalid_states = sorted(
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rule.get("rule_id")
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for rule in escalation_rules
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if rule.get("service_state") not in {"failed", "blocked"}
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)
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if invalid_states:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: immediate escalation must be failure-only: {invalid_states}")
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telegram_non_failure = sorted(
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rule.get("rule_id")
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for rule in payload.get("policy_rules") or []
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if "telegram_ops" in (rule.get("channels") or [])
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and rule.get("decision") != "escalate_immediate"
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)
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if telegram_non_failure:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: telegram_ops must only appear on immediate failure escalation rules")
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template_contract = payload.get("message_template_contract") or {}
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required_fields = set(template_contract.get("required_fields") or [])
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required = {"stage", "next_action", "blocked_reason", "target_id", "severity", "evidence_ref"}
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if not required.issubset(required_fields):
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: message_template_contract.required_fields missing failure context")
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forbidden_fields = set(template_contract.get("forbidden_fields") or [])
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required_forbidden_fields = {
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"secret_value",
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"token",
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"authorization_header",
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"work_window_transcript",
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"codex_user_message",
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"prompt_text",
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"chain_of_thought",
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"session_id",
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"browser_context",
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}
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if not required_forbidden_fields.issubset(forbidden_fields):
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: message_template_contract.forbidden_fields missing redaction boundary")
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def _require_frontend_redaction_contract(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
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contract = payload.get("display_redaction_contract") or {}
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if contract.get("conversation_transcript_display_allowed") is not False:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: conversation transcript display must remain false")
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if contract.get("redaction_required") is not True:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: frontend redaction must be required")
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forbidden = set(contract.get("forbidden_frontend_content") or [])
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required_forbidden = {
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"未核准內部內容",
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"未脫敏操作紀錄",
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"未核准決策細節",
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"工作階段脈絡",
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"機密 / 權杖 / 授權標頭",
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}
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if not required_forbidden.issubset(forbidden):
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: display_redaction_contract is missing required forbidden content")
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allowed_fields = set(contract.get("allowed_frontend_fields") or [])
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if "已提交證據參照" not in allowed_fields or "政策規則摘要" not in allowed_fields:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: display_redaction_contract must limit frontend to committed policy evidence")
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def _require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(value: Any, label: str, path: str = "$") -> None:
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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forbidden_key_fragments = {
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"secret_value",
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"token_value",
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"authorization_header",
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"private_key",
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"webhook_secret",
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"runner_token",
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"api_key_value",
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"password_value",
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}
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for key, nested in value.items():
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lowered = str(key).lower()
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if any(fragment in lowered for fragment in forbidden_key_fragments):
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: forbidden secret payload key at {path}.{key}")
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_require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(nested, label, f"{path}.{key}")
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elif isinstance(value, list):
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for index, nested in enumerate(value):
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_require_no_plaintext_secret_payload_keys(nested, label, f"{path}[{index}]")
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def _require_no_conversation_transcript_content(value: Any, label: str, path: str = "$") -> None:
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if isinstance(value, dict):
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for key, nested in value.items():
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_require_no_conversation_transcript_content(nested, label, f"{path}.{key}")
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elif isinstance(value, list):
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for index, nested in enumerate(value):
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_require_no_conversation_transcript_content(nested, label, f"{path}[{index}]")
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elif isinstance(value, str):
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for marker in _CONVERSATION_TRANSCRIPT_MARKERS:
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if marker in value:
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raise ValueError(f"{label}: forbidden work-window conversation content at {path}")
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