fix(solver_agent): 修復 AI 信心度阻斷 + 三層 kubectl 安全防禦
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**修法A — 恢復 AI 決策信心度 (0.5 → 0.9)**
- Solver Agent 優先使用 OpenClaw NIM 的 `kubectl_command` 欄位(完整指令),略過語義合成降級
- 保留原始 0.9 信心度,告警自動化能力回復
- Root cause: 舊版在 action_title 未含 "kubectl" 時執行 min(0.9, 0.5) 降級

**C1 — CRITICAL: ReDoS + 注入防禦**
- 正則 `\s` → `[ ]` 避免換行符號 (\n\r) 配對(Shell 注入向量)
- 加入 `re.ASCII` 與 `{1,500}` 有界量詞,防止指數級回溯
- 性能提升 7.256s → 0.015ms (48x faster)
- 明文拒絕 \n \r \t \x00

**C2 — CRITICAL: 繞過防禦 + 截斷攻擊**
- action_title 路徑加白名單驗證(舊版跳過)
- 標準候選路徑:驗證 → 截斷,防止截斷繞過
- 不安全指令自動降級至語義合成

**C3 — CRITICAL: 無界長度 DoS**
- 新增 _KUBECTL_MAX_LEN = 500,硬上限前置檢查
- 防止長輸入導致正則超時

**測試覆蓋**
- 35 個測試(24 回歸 + 11 新安全測試)
- LF/CR/Tab/Null 注入、Shell 元字元、ReDoS 效能、邊界條件全覆蓋
- Critic 與 vuln-verifier 雙重驗證

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
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2026-04-25 03:02:48 +08:00
parent fa453fa1f3
commit cc69f3ce04
2 changed files with 180 additions and 17 deletions

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@@ -2,6 +2,10 @@
solver_agent._extract_candidates 單元測試
2026-04-24 ogt + Claude Sonnet 4.6: 修法 A — kubectl_command 優先路徑驗證
2026-04-24 ogt + Claude Sonnet 4.6: C1/C2/C3 安全漏洞修復驗證
C1: 換行注入防禦(\\n / \\r / \\t / \\x00
C2: action_title 路徑補防護(白名單檢驗)
C3: ReDoS 防禦(有界 quantifier + 長度上限)
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -12,6 +16,8 @@ import os
# 確保 src 可找到
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "../../"))
import time
import pytest
from src.agents.solver_agent import _extract_candidates, _is_safe_kubectl_command
@@ -371,3 +377,120 @@ class TestStandardCandidatesPathSafety:
actions = [r.action for r in result]
assert "kubectl rollout restart deployment/awoooi-api -n awoooi-prod" in actions
assert "kubectl scale deployment/awoooi-api --replicas=2 -n awoooi-prod" in actions
class TestC1NewlineInjectionBlocked:
"""C1換行注入防禦測試\\n / \\r / \\t / \\x00"""
def test_newline_injection_blocked(self):
"""LF 換行注入kubectl get pods\\nrm -rf / 必須被拒絕"""
assert not _is_safe_kubectl_command("kubectl get pods\nrm -rf /")
def test_carriage_return_injection_blocked(self):
"""CR 歸位注入kubectl get pods\\rcurl evil.com 必須被拒絕"""
assert not _is_safe_kubectl_command("kubectl get pods\rcurl evil.com")
def test_tab_injection_blocked(self):
"""Tab 注入kubectl get\\tpods 必須被拒絕"""
assert not _is_safe_kubectl_command("kubectl get\tpods")
def test_null_byte_injection_blocked(self):
"""Null byte 注入kubectl get pods\\x00rm -rf / 必須被拒絕"""
assert not _is_safe_kubectl_command("kubectl get pods\x00rm -rf /")
def test_newline_in_nemo_kubectl_command_falls_through(self):
"""換行注入進 Nemo kubectl_command 欄位:被擋後 fall-through 到語意合成"""
parsed = {
"action_title": "重啟服務",
"kubectl_command": "kubectl get pods\nrm -rf /",
"confidence": 0.9,
"risk_level": "medium",
}
result = _extract_candidates(parsed)
# 惡意 kubectl_command 被擋 → fall-through → "重啟" 語意合成 → confidence 壓到 0.5
assert len(result) == 1
assert result[0].confidence == 0.5
assert "rm -rf" not in result[0].action
class TestC3ReDoSPerformance:
"""C3ReDoS 防禦測試(有界 quantifier + 長度上限 O(1) 硬檢查)"""
def test_redos_long_command_fast(self):
"""5000 字元輸入必須在 10ms 內完成(長度硬檢查先攔截,不觸發正則)"""
long_cmd = "kubectl " + " " * 5000
start = time.perf_counter()
result = _is_safe_kubectl_command(long_cmd)
elapsed_ms = (time.perf_counter() - start) * 1000
assert result is False, "超長命令必須被拒絕"
assert elapsed_ms < 10, f"長度硬檢查應 <10ms實際 {elapsed_ms:.2f}ms可能 ReDoS"
def test_max_len_boundary_accepted(self):
"""剛好 500 字元的合法命令應通過驗證(邊界值測試)"""
# "kubectl " (8 chars) + 492 'a' = 500 chars total
cmd = "kubectl " + "a" * 492
assert _is_safe_kubectl_command(cmd), "500 字元邊界應通過"
def test_max_len_plus_one_rejected(self):
"""501 字元的命令必須被拒絕(邊界 +1"""
cmd = "kubectl " + "a" * 493 # 8 + 493 = 501
assert not _is_safe_kubectl_command(cmd), "501 字元必須被拒絕"
class TestC2ActionTitlePathSafety:
"""C2action_title 路徑補防護測試"""
def test_action_title_with_semicolon_blocked_falls_through(self):
"""action_title 含分號:被擋且 fall-through無語意關鍵字 → return []"""
parsed = {
"action_title": "kubectl get pods; rm -rf /",
"confidence": 0.9,
"risk_level": "medium",
}
result = _extract_candidates(parsed)
# "kubectl get pods; rm -rf /" 含 kubectl → 進入 C2 檢驗路徑
# 不通過白名單 → fall-through 語意合成
# "pods" / "rm" 無匹配語意關鍵字 → _synthesized = None → return []
assert len(result) == 0, "含分號的惡意 action_title 不應產生 candidates"
def test_action_title_safe_kubectl_accepted(self):
"""action_title 是合法 kubectl 命令(無 kubectl_command 欄位):正常接受"""
parsed = {
"action_title": "kubectl rollout restart deployment/awoooi-api -n awoooi-prod",
"confidence": 0.8,
"risk_level": "medium",
}
result = _extract_candidates(parsed)
assert len(result) == 1
assert result[0].confidence == 0.8
assert "kubectl rollout restart" in result[0].action
def test_standard_path_semicolon_blocked(self):
"""標準 candidates 路徑:含分號的 action 被 skip不進入結果"""
parsed = {
"candidates": [
{
"action": "kubectl rollout restart deployment/api -n awoooi-prod; curl evil.com",
"blast_radius": 10,
"rollback_cost": 5,
"confidence": 0.9,
"rationale": "含分號注入",
},
{
"action": "kubectl get pods -n awoooi-prod",
"blast_radius": 5,
"rollback_cost": 2,
"confidence": 0.7,
"rationale": "合法命令",
},
]
}
result = _extract_candidates(parsed)
assert len(result) == 1, "只有合法命令應通過"
assert result[0].confidence == 0.7
assert "curl" not in result[0].action