Merge remote-tracking branch 'gitea/main' into codex/iwooos-wazuh-boundary-guard-20260624

# Conflicts:
#	docs/LOGBOOK.md

apps/api/src/services/ai_agent_market_radar_readback.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+"""
+AI Agent market radar readback.
+
+Loads the committed read-only radar artifact. The radar is an operator
+decision surface only; it does not approve SDK installs, paid API calls,
+replay, shadow/canary, Telegram sends, host writes, or production routing.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from src.services.snapshot_paths import default_operations_dir
+
+_DEFAULT_OPERATIONS_DIR = default_operations_dir(Path(__file__))
+_SNAPSHOT_NAME = "ai-agent-market-radar-readback.snapshot.json"
+
+
+def load_latest_ai_agent_market_radar_readback(
+    operations_dir: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Load the committed AI Agent market radar readback snapshot."""
+    directory = operations_dir or _DEFAULT_OPERATIONS_DIR
+    snapshot_path = directory / _SNAPSHOT_NAME
+    with snapshot_path.open(encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        payload = json.load(handle)
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError(f"{snapshot_path}: expected JSON object")
+    if payload.get("schema_version") != "ai_agent_market_radar_readback_v1":
+        raise ValueError(f"{snapshot_path}: unexpected schema_version")
+
+    policy = payload.get("policy") or {}
+    forbidden_true = [
+        key
+        for key in [
+            "sdk_installation_approved",
+            "paid_api_calls_approved",
+            "replay_candidate_approved",
+            "shadow_or_canary_approved",
+            "production_routing_approved",
+            "telegram_send_approved",
+            "host_write_approved",
+            "workflow_modification_approved",
+            "openclaw_replacement_approved",
+        ]
+        if policy.get(key) is not False
+    ]
+    if forbidden_true:
+        raise ValueError(f"{snapshot_path}: unsafe policy flags: {forbidden_true}")
+
+    serialized = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False)
+    forbidden_fragments = [
+        "/Users/",
+        ".claude/projects",
+        ".codex",
+        "192.168.",
+        "auth.json",
+        "conversations",
+        "sessions",
+    ]
+    leaked = [fragment for fragment in forbidden_fragments if fragment in serialized]
+    if leaked:
+        raise ValueError(f"{snapshot_path}: forbidden local or raw-history fragment: {leaked}")
+
+    return payload