feat(governance): 顯示異地 escrow 準備度

apps/api/src/services/offsite_escrow_readiness_status.py

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+"""
+Offsite / escrow readiness status snapshot.
+
+Loads the latest committed, read-only offsite / escrow readiness status. The
+status view never runs backups, restores, offsite sync, credential marker
+writes, credential reads, schedule changes, workflow writes, Telegram test
+notifications, destructive prune, or production routing changes.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from src.services.snapshot_paths import default_evaluations_dir
+
+_DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR = default_evaluations_dir(Path(__file__))
+_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN = "offsite_escrow_readiness_status_*.json"
+_SCHEMA_VERSION = "offsite_escrow_readiness_status_v1"
+
+
+def load_latest_offsite_escrow_readiness_status(
+    evaluations_dir: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Load the newest committed offsite / escrow readiness status snapshot."""
+    directory = evaluations_dir or _DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR
+    candidates = sorted(directory.glob(_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN))
+    if not candidates:
+        raise FileNotFoundError(f"no offsite / escrow readiness status snapshots found in {directory}")
+
+    latest = candidates[-1]
+    with latest.open(encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        payload = json.load(handle)
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError(f"{latest}: expected JSON object")
+    _require_schema(payload, _SCHEMA_VERSION, str(latest))
+    _require_read_only_boundaries(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_operation_boundaries(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_rollup_consistency(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_redacted_cards(payload, str(latest))
+    return payload
+
+
+def _require_schema(payload: dict[str, Any], expected: str, label: str) -> None:
+    actual = payload.get("schema_version")
+    if actual != expected:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: expected schema_version={expected}, got {actual!r}")
+
+
+def _require_read_only_boundaries(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    program_status = payload.get("program_status") or {}
+    if program_status.get("read_only_mode") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: program_status.read_only_mode must be true")
+
+    boundaries = payload.get("approval_boundaries") or {}
+    blocked_flags = {
+        "sdk_installation_allowed",
+        "paid_api_call_allowed",
+        "shadow_or_canary_allowed",
+        "production_routing_allowed",
+        "destructive_operation_allowed",
+        "restore_execution_allowed",
+        "offsite_sync_execution_allowed",
+        "credential_marker_write_allowed",
+    }
+    allowed = sorted(flag for flag in blocked_flags if boundaries.get(flag) is not False)
+    if allowed:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: approval boundaries must remain false: {allowed}")
+
+
+def _require_operation_boundaries(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    boundaries = payload.get("operation_boundaries") or {}
+    if boundaries.get("read_only_status_allowed") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: read_only_status_allowed must be true")
+
+    blocked_flags = {
+        "backup_execution_allowed",
+        "restore_execution_allowed",
+        "offsite_sync_execution_allowed",
+        "credential_marker_write_allowed",
+        "credential_read_allowed",
+        "secret_plaintext_allowed",
+        "schedule_change_allowed",
+        "workflow_write_allowed",
+        "telegram_test_notification_allowed",
+        "destructive_prune_allowed",
+        "production_routing_allowed",
+    }
+    allowed = sorted(flag for flag in blocked_flags if boundaries.get(flag) is not False)
+    if allowed:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: operation boundaries must remain false: {allowed}")
+
+
+def _require_rollup_consistency(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    cards = payload.get("readiness_cards") or []
+    rollups = payload.get("rollups") or {}
+    if rollups.get("total_cards") != len(cards):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.total_cards must match readiness_cards")
+
+    verified_offsite = {
+        card.get("card_id")
+        for card in cards
+        if card.get("kind") == "offsite_mirror" and card.get("readiness") == "verified"
+    }
+    if set(rollups.get("verified_offsite_card_ids") or []) != verified_offsite:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.verified_offsite_card_ids must match verified offsite cards")
+
+    blocked_escrow = {
+        card.get("card_id")
+        for card in cards
+        if card.get("kind") == "credential_escrow" and card.get("readiness") == "blocked"
+    }
+    if set(rollups.get("blocked_escrow_card_ids") or []) != blocked_escrow:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.blocked_escrow_card_ids must match blocked escrow cards")
+
+    action_required = {
+        card.get("card_id")
+        for card in cards
+        if card.get("readiness") == "action_required"
+    }
+    if set(rollups.get("action_required_card_ids") or []) != action_required:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.action_required_card_ids must match action_required cards")
+
+    execution_blocked = {
+        card.get("card_id")
+        for card in cards
+        if any(operation.endswith("_execution") or operation == "credential_marker_write" for operation in card.get("blocked_operations", []))
+    }
+    if set(rollups.get("execution_blocked_card_ids") or []) != execution_blocked:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.execution_blocked_card_ids must match cards with blocked execution operations")
+
+
+def _require_redacted_cards(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    cards = payload.get("readiness_cards") or []
+    forbidden_exposure = {
+        "plaintext",
+        "secret_plaintext",
+        "credential_plaintext",
+        "token_visible",
+    }
+    exposed = sorted(
+        card.get("card_id")
+        for card in cards
+        if card.get("credential_exposure_status") in forbidden_exposure
+    )
+    if exposed:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: credential exposure must stay redacted: {exposed}")
+
+    contract = payload.get("operator_contract") or {}
+    must_not_interpret_as = set(contract.get("must_not_interpret_as") or [])
+    required_denials = {
+        "復原批准",
+        "異地同步批准",
+        "credential marker 寫入批准",
+        "完整 DR 綠燈",
+    }
+    if not required_denials.issubset(must_not_interpret_as):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: operator_contract.must_not_interpret_as is missing required denials")