feat(governance): 新增 Agent 工具採用批准包

apps/api/src/services/ai_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package.py

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+"""
+AI Agent tool adoption approval package snapshot.
+
+Loads the latest committed, read-only approval package for adopting tools such
+as Renovate, OSV-Scanner, Trivy, Syft, and Grype. This module never installs
+tools, writes CI workflows, downloads vulnerability databases, queries
+registries, creates PRs, sends Telegram messages, or changes production.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from src.services.snapshot_paths import default_evaluations_dir
+
+_DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR = default_evaluations_dir(Path(__file__))
+_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN = "ai_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package_*.json"
+_SCHEMA_VERSION = "ai_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package_v1"
+_RUNTIME_AUTHORITY = "approval_package_only_no_tool_install_or_ci_change"
+
+
+def load_latest_ai_agent_tool_adoption_approval_package(
+    evaluations_dir: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Load the newest committed AI Agent tool adoption approval package."""
+    directory = evaluations_dir or _DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR
+    candidates = sorted(directory.glob(_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN))
+    if not candidates:
+        raise FileNotFoundError(
+            f"no AI Agent tool adoption approval package snapshots found in {directory}"
+        )
+
+    latest = candidates[-1]
+    with latest.open(encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        payload = json.load(handle)
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError(f"{latest}: expected JSON object")
+    _require_schema(payload, _SCHEMA_VERSION, str(latest))
+    _require_read_only_boundaries(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_rollup_consistency(payload, str(latest))
+    _require_tool_safety(payload, str(latest))
+    return payload
+
+
+def _require_schema(payload: dict[str, Any], expected: str, label: str) -> None:
+    actual = payload.get("schema_version")
+    if actual != expected:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: expected schema_version={expected}, got {actual!r}")
+
+
+def _require_read_only_boundaries(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    program_status = payload.get("program_status") or {}
+    if program_status.get("read_only_mode") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: program_status.read_only_mode must be true")
+    if program_status.get("runtime_authority") != _RUNTIME_AUTHORITY:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: runtime_authority must stay {_RUNTIME_AUTHORITY}")
+
+    boundaries = payload.get("approval_boundaries") or {}
+    blocked_flags = {
+        "tool_install_allowed",
+        "ci_workflow_change_allowed",
+        "external_registry_lookup_allowed",
+        "vulnerability_database_download_allowed",
+        "package_upgrade_allowed",
+        "lockfile_write_allowed",
+        "docker_build_allowed",
+        "image_pull_allowed",
+        "gitea_pr_creation_allowed",
+        "auto_merge_allowed",
+        "telegram_direct_send_allowed",
+        "paid_service_enabled",
+        "production_route_change_allowed",
+        "secret_plaintext_allowed",
+    }
+    allowed = sorted(flag for flag in blocked_flags if boundaries.get(flag) is not False)
+    if allowed:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: approval boundaries must remain false: {allowed}")
+
+
+def _require_rollup_consistency(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    tools = payload.get("tool_candidates") or []
+    sources = payload.get("source_evidence") or []
+    lanes = payload.get("adoption_lanes") or []
+    rollups = payload.get("rollups") or {}
+
+    expected_counts = {
+        "tool_count": len(tools),
+        "source_evidence_count": len(sources),
+        "adoption_lane_count": len(lanes),
+    }
+    mismatched = {
+        key: {"expected": expected, "actual": rollups.get(key)}
+        for key, expected in expected_counts.items()
+        if rollups.get(key) != expected
+    }
+    if mismatched:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollup counts must match payload sections: {mismatched}")
+
+    expected_lists = {
+        "approval_required_tool_ids": sorted(
+            tool.get("tool_id")
+            for tool in tools
+            if tool.get("adoption_status") == "approval_required"
+        ),
+        "ci_change_required_tool_ids": sorted(
+            tool.get("tool_id") for tool in tools if tool.get("ci_change_required") is True
+        ),
+        "secret_required_tool_ids": sorted(
+            tool.get("tool_id") for tool in tools if _requires_secret_review(tool)
+        ),
+        "external_data_required_tool_ids": sorted(
+            tool.get("tool_id") for tool in tools if _requires_external_data_gate(tool)
+        ),
+    }
+    for key, expected in expected_lists.items():
+        if sorted(rollups.get(key) or []) != expected:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollups.{key} mismatch")
+
+    zero_rollups = {
+        "tool_install_allowed_count",
+        "ci_change_allowed_count",
+        "auto_merge_allowed_count",
+        "telegram_direct_send_count",
+    }
+    nonzero = sorted(key for key in zero_rollups if rollups.get(key) != 0)
+    if nonzero:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollout safety counters must remain 0: {nonzero}")
+
+
+def _require_tool_safety(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    source_ids = {source.get("source_id") for source in payload.get("source_evidence") or []}
+    unsafe_tools = [
+        tool.get("tool_id")
+        for tool in payload.get("tool_candidates") or []
+        if tool.get("adoption_status") != "approval_required"
+        or not tool.get("approval_requirements")
+        or not tool.get("blocked_until_approval")
+        or not set(tool.get("official_source_refs") or []).issubset(source_ids)
+        or not tool.get("rollback_plan")
+    ]
+    if unsafe_tools:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: tools must stay approval-bound: {unsafe_tools}")
+
+    unsafe_lanes = [
+        lane.get("lane_id")
+        for lane in payload.get("adoption_lanes") or []
+        if not lane.get("approval_gate") or not lane.get("blocked_now")
+    ]
+    if unsafe_lanes:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: adoption lanes need approval gates: {unsafe_lanes}")
+
+    missing_required_fields = [
+        field.get("field_id")
+        for field in payload.get("approval_packet_fields") or []
+        if field.get("required") is True and not field.get("description")
+    ]
+    if missing_required_fields:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: approval fields need descriptions: {missing_required_fields}")
+
+
+def _requires_secret_review(tool: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    requirement = str(tool.get("secret_requirement") or "").lower()
+    return "credentials" in requirement or "token" in requirement
+
+
+def _requires_external_data_gate(tool: dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
+    requirement = str(tool.get("external_data_requirement") or "").lower()
+    if requirement.startswith("no external"):
+        return False
+    return (
+        "currently blocked" in requirement
+        or "metadata required" in requirement
+        or "database required" in requirement
+        or "db required" in requirement
+    )