feat(governance): 新增 canonical runtime readback owner acceptance

apps/api/src/api/v1/agents.py

@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ from src.services.ai_agent_automation_inventory_snapshot import (
 from src.services.ai_agent_candidate_operation_dry_run_evidence import (
     load_latest_ai_agent_candidate_operation_dry_run_evidence,
 )
+from src.services.ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance import (
+    load_latest_ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance,
+)
 from src.services.ai_agent_communication_learning_contract import (
     load_latest_ai_agent_communication_learning_contract,
 )
@@ -1491,6 +1494,36 @@ async def get_agent_owner_approved_fixture_promotion_gate() -> dict[str, Any]:
         ) from exc
 
 
+@router.get(
+    "/agent-canonical-runtime-readback-owner-acceptance",
+    response_model=dict[str, Any],
+    summary="取得 AI Agent canonical runtime readback owner acceptance",
+    description=(
+        "讀取最新已提交的 P2-115 canonical runtime readback owner acceptance；"
+        "此端點只回傳 owner acceptance package、canonical target scope、no-live verifier、"
+        "blocked acceptance 與 operator handoff，不讀 canonical runtime target、不做 live query、"
+        "不寫 acceptance record、不寫 reviewer queue、不寫 Gateway queue、不送 Telegram、"
+        "不呼叫 Bot API、不寫 result capture、不寫 learning / PlayBook trust、不讀 secret。"
+    ),
+)
+async def get_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Return the latest read-only canonical runtime readback owner acceptance."""
+    try:
+        payload = await asyncio.to_thread(load_latest_ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance)
+        return redact_public_lan_topology(payload)
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
+            detail=str(exc),
+        ) from exc
+    except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
+        logger.error("ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance_invalid", error=str(exc))
+        raise HTTPException(
+            status_code=status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            detail="AI Agent canonical runtime readback owner acceptance 無效",
+        ) from exc
+
+
 @router.get(
     "/agent-owner-approved-fixture-dry-run",
     response_model=dict[str, Any],

apps/api/src/services/ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+"""
+AI Agent canonical runtime readback owner acceptance snapshot.
+
+Loads the latest committed P2-115 owner acceptance package. This module validates
+committed evidence only; it never reads canonical runtime targets, performs live
+queries, writes reviewer queues, writes result captures, writes Gateway queues,
+sends Telegram messages, calls Bot API, reads secrets, or performs destructive
+operations.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Any
+
+from src.services.snapshot_paths import default_evaluations_dir
+
+_DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR = default_evaluations_dir(Path(__file__))
+_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN = "ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance_*.json"
+_SCHEMA_VERSION = "ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance_v1"
+_RUNTIME_AUTHORITY = "canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance_only_no_live_read_or_write"
+
+
+def load_latest_ai_agent_canonical_runtime_readback_owner_acceptance(
+    evaluations_dir: Path | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Load the newest committed canonical runtime readback owner acceptance."""
+    directory = evaluations_dir or _DEFAULT_EVALUATIONS_DIR
+    candidates = sorted(directory.glob(_SNAPSHOT_PATTERN))
+    if not candidates:
+        raise FileNotFoundError(f"no AI Agent canonical runtime readback owner acceptance snapshots found in {directory}")
+
+    latest = candidates[-1]
+    with latest.open(encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        payload = json.load(handle)
+
+    if not isinstance(payload, dict):
+        raise ValueError(f"{latest}: expected JSON object")
+
+    label = str(latest)
+    _require_schema(payload, label)
+    _require_prior(payload, label)
+    _require_truth(payload, label)
+    _require_packets(payload, label)
+    _require_acceptance_templates(payload, label)
+    _require_fixture_reviews(payload, label)
+    _require_verifier_plans(payload, label)
+    _require_blocked_promotions(payload, label)
+    _require_actions(payload, label)
+    _require_display_redaction(payload, label)
+    _require_no_forbidden_display_terms(payload, label)
+    _require_rollup_consistency(payload, label)
+    return payload
+
+
+def _require_schema(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    if payload.get("schema_version") != _SCHEMA_VERSION:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: expected schema_version={_SCHEMA_VERSION}")
+    status = payload.get("program_status") or {}
+    expected = {
+        "current_priority": "P2",
+        "current_task_id": "P2-115",
+        "next_task_id": "P2-116",
+        "read_only_mode": True,
+        "runtime_authority": _RUNTIME_AUTHORITY,
+        "overall_completion_percent": 100,
+    }
+    mismatches = _mismatches(status, expected)
+    if mismatches:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: program_status mismatch: {mismatches}")
+    if not status.get("status_note"):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: program_status.status_note is required")
+
+
+def _require_prior(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    prior = payload.get("prior_promotion_gate") or {}
+    expected = {
+        "schema_version": "ai_agent_runtime_readback_promotion_gate_v1",
+        "promotion_lane_count": 5,
+        "receipt_contract_count": 4,
+        "reviewer_queue_preview_count": 4,
+        "result_capture_preview_count": 4,
+        "no_write_verifier_check_count": 5,
+        "blocker_mapping_count": 5,
+        "operator_action_count": 5,
+        "owner_approval_received_count": 0,
+        "promotion_execution_count": 0,
+        "canonical_runtime_target_read_count": 0,
+        "live_query_count": 0,
+        "production_write_count": 0,
+    }
+    mismatches = _mismatches(prior, expected)
+    if mismatches:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: prior_promotion_gate mismatch: {mismatches}")
+    if not prior.get("readiness_note"):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: prior_promotion_gate.readiness_note is required")
+
+
+def _require_truth(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    truth = payload.get("owner_gate_truth") or {}
+    required_true = {
+        "p2_113_promotion_gate_loaded",
+        "owner_promotion_package_ready",
+        "acceptance_record_template_ready",
+        "reviewer_queue_fixture_ready",
+        "result_capture_fixture_ready",
+        "rollback_owner_required",
+        "verifier_plan_required",
+    }
+    missing = sorted(field for field in required_true if truth.get(field) is not True)
+    if missing:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: owner gate ready flags must remain true: {missing}")
+    if truth.get("owner_approval_received") is not False:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: owner approval must remain false before acceptance")
+
+    required_false = {
+        "canonical_runtime_target_read_enabled",
+        "live_query_enabled",
+        "failure_receipt_send_enabled",
+        "reviewer_queue_write_enabled",
+        "gateway_queue_write_enabled",
+        "telegram_send_enabled",
+        "bot_api_call_enabled",
+        "report_receipt_write_enabled",
+        "result_capture_write_enabled",
+        "learning_write_enabled",
+        "playbook_trust_write_enabled",
+        "production_write_enabled",
+        "secret_read_enabled",
+        "destructive_operation_enabled",
+    }
+    unsafe = sorted(field for field in required_false if truth.get(field) is not False)
+    if unsafe:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: live read/send/write flags must remain false: {unsafe}")
+
+    zero_counts = {
+        "owner_approval_received_count",
+        "owner_acceptance_record_write_count",
+        "promotion_execution_count",
+        "canonical_runtime_target_read_count",
+        "live_query_count",
+        "failure_receipt_send_count",
+        "reviewer_queue_write_count",
+        "gateway_queue_write_count",
+        "telegram_send_count",
+        "bot_api_call_count",
+        "report_receipt_write_count",
+        "result_capture_write_count",
+        "learning_write_count",
+        "playbook_trust_write_count",
+        "production_write_count",
+    }
+    non_zero = sorted(field for field in zero_counts if truth.get(field) != 0)
+    if non_zero:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: owner promotion live counters must remain zero: {non_zero}")
+    if not truth.get("truth_note"):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: owner_gate_truth.truth_note is required")
+
+
+def _require_packets(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    packets = payload.get("owner_approval_packets") or []
+    required = {
+        "failure_receipt_owner_packet",
+        "reviewer_queue_owner_packet",
+        "result_capture_owner_packet",
+        "report_receipt_owner_packet",
+        "p2_115_scope_owner_packet",
+    }
+    packet_ids = {packet.get("packet_id") for packet in packets}
+    if packet_ids != required:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: owner approval packets must match {sorted(required)}")
+    for packet in packets:
+        packet_id = packet.get("packet_id")
+        if packet.get("owner_acceptance_required") is not True:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: packet {packet_id} must require owner acceptance")
+        if packet.get("status") not in {"ready_for_owner_review", "approval_required", "blocked_by_policy"}:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: packet {packet_id} status is invalid")
+        if packet.get("risk_tier") not in {"high", "critical"}:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: packet {packet_id} risk_tier is invalid")
+        if not packet.get("required_owner_fields") or not packet.get("blocked_runtime_actions"):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: packet {packet_id} must list owner fields and blocked actions")
+        if not _is_redacted_sha256(packet.get("evidence_hash")):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: packet {packet_id} must expose redacted evidence_hash")
+
+
+def _require_acceptance_templates(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    templates = payload.get("acceptance_record_templates") or []
+    if len(templates) != 4:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: acceptance_record_templates must contain 4 items")
+    for template in templates:
+        template_id = template.get("template_id")
+        if template.get("accepted") is not False or template.get("record_write_enabled") is not False:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: template {template_id} must not be accepted or write-enabled")
+        if not template.get("required_fields"):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: template {template_id} required_fields is required")
+        if not _is_redacted_sha256(template.get("evidence_hash")):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: template {template_id} must expose redacted evidence_hash")
+
+
+def _require_fixture_reviews(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    reviews = payload.get("fixture_promotion_reviews") or []
+    if len(reviews) != 4:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: fixture_promotion_reviews must contain 4 items")
+    for review in reviews:
+        review_id = review.get("review_id")
+        if review.get("runtime_write_enabled") is not False:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: review {review_id} must not enable runtime write")
+        if not review.get("source_packet_id") or not review.get("review_outcome"):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: review {review_id} source/outcome is required")
+        if not _is_redacted_sha256(review.get("evidence_hash")):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: review {review_id} must expose redacted evidence_hash")
+
+
+def _require_verifier_plans(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    plans = payload.get("no_write_verifier_plans") or []
+    required = {
+        "no_telegram_send_verifier",
+        "no_reviewer_queue_write_verifier",
+        "no_result_capture_write_verifier",
+        "no_live_readback_verifier",
+        "no_secret_payload_verifier",
+    }
+    plan_ids = {plan.get("plan_id") for plan in plans}
+    if plan_ids != required:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: no-write verifier plans must match {sorted(required)}")
+    for plan in plans:
+        plan_id = plan.get("plan_id")
+        if plan.get("live_verifier_enabled") is not False:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: verifier plan {plan_id} must not enable live verifier")
+        if not plan.get("required_fixture") or not plan.get("failure_if_missing"):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: verifier plan {plan_id} must include fixture and failure text")
+        if not _is_redacted_sha256(plan.get("evidence_hash")):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: verifier plan {plan_id} must expose redacted evidence_hash")
+
+
+def _require_blocked_promotions(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    blockers = payload.get("blocked_promotions") or []
+    required = {
+        "owner_acceptance_not_received",
+        "rollback_owner_missing",
+        "maintenance_window_missing",
+        "canonical_readback_scope_missing",
+        "secret_boundary_not_verified",
+    }
+    blocker_ids = {blocker.get("blocker_id") for blocker in blockers}
+    if blocker_ids != required:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: blocked promotions must match {sorted(required)}")
+    for blocker in blockers:
+        blocker_id = blocker.get("blocker_id")
+        if blocker.get("severity") not in {"high", "critical"}:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: blocker {blocker_id} severity is invalid")
+        if blocker.get("status") not in {"approval_required", "blocked_by_policy"}:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: blocker {blocker_id} status is invalid")
+        if not blocker.get("blocked_action") or not blocker.get("blocked_until"):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: blocker {blocker_id} blocked action/until is required")
+        if not _is_redacted_sha256(blocker.get("evidence_hash")):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: blocker {blocker_id} must expose redacted evidence_hash")
+
+
+def _require_actions(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    actions = payload.get("operator_actions") or []
+    required = {
+        "review_owner_packets",
+        "verify_acceptance_templates",
+        "confirm_verifier_plans",
+        "lock_blocked_promotions",
+        "promote_to_p2_116",
+    }
+    action_ids = {action.get("action_id") for action in actions}
+    if action_ids != required:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: operator actions must match {sorted(required)}")
+    for action in actions:
+        action_id = action.get("action_id")
+        if action.get("runtime_promotion_allowed") is not False:
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: action {action_id} must not allow runtime promotion")
+        if not action.get("operator_instruction"):
+            raise ValueError(f"{label}: action {action_id} operator_instruction is required")
+
+
+def _require_display_redaction(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    contract = payload.get("display_redaction_contract") or {}
+    if contract.get("redaction_required") is not True:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: display redaction must be required")
+    false_fields = {
+        "raw_prompt_display_allowed",
+        "private_reasoning_display_allowed",
+        "secret_value_display_allowed",
+        "raw_runtime_payload_display_allowed",
+        "internal_collaboration_content_display_allowed",
+    }
+    unsafe = sorted(field for field in false_fields if contract.get(field) is not False)
+    if unsafe:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: display redaction flags must remain false: {unsafe}")
+    if not contract.get("frontend_display_policy"):
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: frontend_display_policy is required")
+
+
+def _require_no_forbidden_display_terms(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    serialized = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False).lower()
+    forbidden = {
+        "work_window_transcript",
+        "session_id",
+        "browser_context",
+        "authorization_header",
+        "raw telegram payload",
+        "private reasoning",
+        "raw prompt",
+        "chain-of-thought",
+    }
+    hits = sorted(term for term in forbidden if term in serialized)
+    if hits:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: forbidden display terms leaked: {hits}")
+
+
+def _require_rollup_consistency(payload: dict[str, Any], label: str) -> None:
+    rollups = payload.get("rollups") or {}
+    expected_counts = {
+        "owner_approval_packet_count": len(payload.get("owner_approval_packets") or []),
+        "acceptance_record_template_count": len(payload.get("acceptance_record_templates") or []),
+        "fixture_promotion_review_count": len(payload.get("fixture_promotion_reviews") or []),
+        "no_write_verifier_plan_count": len(payload.get("no_write_verifier_plans") or []),
+        "blocked_promotion_count": len(payload.get("blocked_promotions") or []),
+        "operator_action_count": len(payload.get("operator_actions") or []),
+        "approval_required_packet_count": sum(
+            1 for packet in payload.get("owner_approval_packets") or [] if packet.get("status") == "approval_required"
+        ),
+        "blocked_packet_count": sum(
+            1 for packet in payload.get("owner_approval_packets") or [] if packet.get("status") == "blocked_by_policy"
+        ),
+        "approval_required_template_count": sum(
+            1
+            for template in payload.get("acceptance_record_templates") or []
+            if template.get("status") == "approval_required"
+        ),
+        "blocked_template_count": sum(
+            1
+            for template in payload.get("acceptance_record_templates") or []
+            if template.get("status") == "blocked_by_policy"
+        ),
+        "approval_required_review_count": sum(
+            1 for review in payload.get("fixture_promotion_reviews") or [] if review.get("status") == "approval_required"
+        ),
+        "blocked_review_count": sum(
+            1 for review in payload.get("fixture_promotion_reviews") or [] if review.get("status") == "blocked_by_policy"
+        ),
+        "approval_required_verifier_count": sum(
+            1 for plan in payload.get("no_write_verifier_plans") or [] if plan.get("status") == "approval_required"
+        ),
+        "blocked_verifier_count": sum(
+            1 for plan in payload.get("no_write_verifier_plans") or [] if plan.get("status") == "blocked_by_policy"
+        ),
+        "critical_blocker_count": sum(
+            1 for blocker in payload.get("blocked_promotions") or [] if blocker.get("severity") == "critical"
+        ),
+    }
+    mismatches = _mismatches(rollups, expected_counts)
+    if mismatches:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: rollup counts mismatch: {mismatches}")
+
+    zero_rollups = {
+        "owner_approval_received_count",
+        "owner_acceptance_record_write_count",
+        "promotion_execution_count",
+        "canonical_runtime_target_read_count",
+        "live_query_count",
+        "failure_receipt_send_count",
+        "reviewer_queue_write_count",
+        "gateway_queue_write_count",
+        "telegram_send_count",
+        "bot_api_call_count",
+        "report_receipt_write_count",
+        "result_capture_write_count",
+        "learning_write_count",
+        "playbook_trust_write_count",
+        "production_write_count",
+        "secret_read_count",
+        "destructive_operation_count",
+    }
+    non_zero = sorted(field for field in zero_rollups if rollups.get(field) != 0)
+    if non_zero:
+        raise ValueError(f"{label}: live/send/write rollups must remain zero: {non_zero}")
+
+
+def _mismatches(actual: dict[str, Any], expected: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, dict[str, Any]]:
+    return {
+        key: {"expected": expected_value, "actual": actual.get(key)}
+        for key, expected_value in expected.items()
+        if actual.get(key) != expected_value
+    }
+
+
+def _is_redacted_sha256(value: Any) -> bool:
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return False
+    if not value.startswith("sha256:") or len(value) != len("sha256:") + 64:
+        return False
+    digest = value.split(":", 1)[1]
+    return all(char in "0123456789abcdef" for char in digest)